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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-2886 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
FABIO GIL-POLANCO 
a/k/a FABIO GIL  
a/k/a JOSE CUEVAS  
a/k/a SANDY REYES 
 
FABIO GIL-POLANCO, 
   Appellant 
________________ 
        
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
District Court No. 2-10-cr-00522-001 
District Judge:  The Honorable Michael M. Baylson 
                               
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 28, 2012 
 
Before: SMITH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
and RAKOFF, Senior District Judge  
 
(Filed: June 28, 2012 ) 
_____________________ 
                                                 
 The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, Senior United States District Judge for the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. 
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  OPINION 
_____________________ 
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Fabio Gil-Polanco, a native and citizen 
of the Dominican Republic, pleaded guilty to unlawful reentry after deportation in 
violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2).  Gil-Polanco’s plea agreement 
contained a broad appellate waiver, permitting an appeal under limited 
circumstances.  The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania sentenced Gil-Polanco to, inter alia, an above-guidelines sentence of 
48 months of imprisonment.  The following day, Gil-Polanco, proceeding pro se, 
filed a notice of appeal.
1
  Thereafter, his counsel moved to withdraw pursuant to 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 
In Anders, the Supreme Court stated that the “constitutional requirement of 
substantial equality and fair process” means that appellate counsel must act as an 
advocate for the defendant.  386 U.S. at 744.  Thus, counsel’s  
role as advocate requires that he support his client’s appeal to the best 
of his ability.  Of course, if counsel finds his case to be wholly 
frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise 
the court and request permission to withdraw.  That request must, 
however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the 
                                                 
1
  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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record that might arguably support the appeal.   
 
Id.  As we explained in United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001), 
the Anders brief must demonstrate that counsel has “thoroughly examined the 
record in search of appealable issues,” and it must “explain why the issues are 
frivolous.”  Accordingly, our inquiry is twofold: (1) whether counsel adequately 
fulfilled the requirements of Anders; and (2) “whether an independent review of 
the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  Id. (citing United States v. Marvin, 
211 F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 2000)); see also Anders, 386 U.S. at 744 (explaining 
that the court must proceed, “after a full examination of all the proceedings, to 
decide whether the case is wholly frivolous”).  If review fails to reveal any 
nonfrivolous issues, the court “may grant counsel’s request to withdraw and 
dismiss the appeal.”  Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. 
After considering counsel’s Anders brief, we are satisfied that counsel 
fulfilled the requirements of Anders.  As counsel noted, Gil-Polanco pleaded guilty 
and his plea agreement contained a broad appellate waiver.  As a result, Gil-
Polanco’s right to appeal is limited by not only the appellate waiver, see United 
States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 2001), but also the general rule that a 
defendant who pleads guilty may attack only the validity of his guilty plea and the 
legality of his sentence.  See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).  
 
 4 
Counsel contends that there is no basis for challenging the validity of Gil-
Polanco’s guilty plea as it was voluntary and knowing.  Indeed, Gil-Polanco’s 
informal pro se brief does not dispute the validity of his guilty plea.
2
  
Because the sentence imposed by the District Court exceeded the sentencing 
guideline range, we conclude, consistent with the exception set forth in Gil-
Polanco’s appellate waiver, that he may challenge the substantive reasonableness 
of his sentence.
3
  We agree with counsel, however, that any such challenge lacks 
merit.  Although the 48 month term of imprisonment exceeds the sentencing 
guideline range of 24 to 30 months, it does not exceed the statutory maximum of 
20 years.  The District Court properly considered the sentencing factors set forth in 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in fashioning the sentence.  Citing the fact that Gil-Polanco’s 
conviction was his third such conviction for unlawful reentry after deportation and 
that the instant conviction was committed during his term of supervised release on 
the second conviction for unlawful reentry, the District Court concluded that Gil-
Polanco had little regard for the laws of the United States.  The District Court 
further noted that Gil-Polanco had not been deterred by his previous sentences of 
                                                 
2
  Gil-Polanco received a copy of counsel’s Anders brief and the motion to 
withdraw as counsel.  Consistent with Third Circuit L.A.R. 109.2(a), Gil-Polanco 
filed a pro se informal brief, challenging only the reasonableness of the District 
Court’s sentence of 48 months. 
3  
We review the District Court’s sentence for an abuse of discretion.  United States 
v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
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10 and 24 months, and it expressed doubt whether Gil-Polanco would be 
personally deterred by the sentence to be imposed.  Nonetheless, the District Court 
believed that it needed to deter others, who might be tempted to illegally reenter 
the United States.  These are valid considerations under § 3553(a).  See 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3553(a)(2)(A) and (B).  We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in imposing an upward variance of 48 months of imprisonment. 
For the above stated reasons, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw 
and affirm the judgment of the District Court.  We certify that the issues presented 
in the appeal lack legal merit and thus do not require the filing of a petition for writ 
of certiorari with the Supreme Court.  3rd Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(b). 
 
